We develop a general theory of intertemporal choice: the reference-time theory, RT. RT is a synthesis of ideas from the hyperbolic model and subadditivity of time discounting. These models are extended to allow for a reference point for time as well as wealth. RT is able to account for all the 6 main anomalies of time discounting: gain-loss asymmetry, magnitude e¤ect, common di¤erence e¤ect, delay-speedup asymmetry, apparent intransitivity of time preferences, and non-additivity of time discounting. We provide a class of utility functions compatible with RT. We show how RT can be extended to incorporate uncertainty and attribute models of intertemporal choice.
Introduction
The standard model of intertemporal choice, exponentially discounted utility (EDU), is contradicted by a large body of empirical evidence. See, for example, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) , Frederick et al. (2002) and Manzini and Mariotti (2008) . Moreover, these anomalies are not simply mistakes; see Frederick et al. (2002) , section 4.3. To develop models that provide a better explanation of economic behavior over time, it is imperative to take account of these anomalies. Subsection 1.1, below, outlines the anomalies. Subsection 1.2 overviews the current explanations. Subsection 1.3 outlines our approach.
Anomalies of intertemporal choice
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), henceforth 'LP', described the following four anomalies, all with good empirical support:
1. Gain-loss asymmetry (or sign e¤ect). Subjects in a study by Loewenstein (1988b) were, on average, indi¤erent between receiving $10 immediately and receiving $21 one year later (an implied discount rate of 74% per annum 1 ). They were also indi¤erent between loosing $10 immediately and losing $15 dollars one year later (an implied discount rate of 40:5% per annum). This is inconsistent with EDU because the implied discount rates are di¤erent and they are both too high (even allowing for capital market imperfections and liquidity constraints).
2. Magnitude e¤ect. Thaler (1981) reported that subjects were, on average, indi¤erent between receiving $15 immediately and $60 one year later (an implied discount rate of 139% per annum). They were also indi¤erent between receiving $3000 immediately and receiving $4000 one year later (an implied discount rate of 29% per annum). This contradicts EDU in that the implied discount rate is magnitude dependent and is too high.
3. Common di¤erence e¤ect 2 . Thaler (1981): A person might prefer one apple today 1 The estimated discount factor D e is the ratio of current to future reward times the ratio of marginal utilities. Assuming that the marginal utilities are approximately the same, the ratio of rewards is simply used to approximate D e : Thus, in this case, D e = 10 21 = 0:476 19: Assuming continuous compounding, D e D = e ; where is the discount rate. Taking logs on both sides, = ln D e ; which in this case is ln(0:476 19) = 0:741 94, as claimed. The same method is used to report the other discount rates in experiments, below. 2 The common di¤ erence e¤ ect is also known as the delay e¤ ect or preference reversal. However, 'preference reversal' is also used to describe (for example) the following situation: A consumer strictly prefers bundle x to bundle y. But when a new bundle, z, is introduced, the consumer now strictly prefers y to x. The latter phenomenon is a framing e¤ect and leads to violation of independence. The 'common di¤erence e¤ect'need not be due to framing nor need it lead to a violation of independence. On this point, see Manzini and Mariotti (2008, subsection 3.1) .
to two apples tomorrow (an implied real discount rate of 25300% per annum), but at the same time prefer two apples in 51 days to one apple in 50 days (there is no evidence that this is due to an expected change in the real discount rate). 3 This is a violation of a fundamental principle of EDU, namely, that discounting only depends on the time interval between two rewards.
4. Delay-speedup asymmetry. Loewenstein (1988a) reported that, in general, the amount required to compensate for delay in receiving a real reward by a given interval, from s to s + t, was two to four times greater than what the subjects were willing to sacri…ce to bring consumption forward from s + t to s. (Neo)classically, these quantities should be the same. Recent scholarship has added two further anomalies:
5. Non-additivity of time discounting. Discounting from time t back to time s then further back to time r is not the same as discounting from time t back to time r in one step (Read, 2001 and Read, 2006a ).
6. Intransitivity of time preferences. The following cycles have been observed: x received at time r is preferred to y received at time s, which is preferred to z received at time t, which is preferred to x received at time r (Roelofsma and Read, 2000).
Explaining the anomalies
We very brie ‡y summarize some attempts at explaining anomalies 1-6. These attempts will be discussed in greater depth later in the paper. The main explanations of the magnitude e¤ect and the gain-loss asymmetry are due to Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) (henceforth, 'LP'). LP explained the magnitude e¤ect through a value function with increasing elasticity. This makes higher magnitudes more salient. They explained gain-loss asymmetry by adopting a value function with greater elasticity for losses than for gains, which makes losses more salient. We are not aware of alternative generally accepted explanations of these two anomalies.
There are several competing explanations of the common di¤erence e¤ect (CDE). The CDE is explained in LP by the notion of declining impatience (roughly, one is more impatient as the date of the reward approaches). Hence, despite identical intervals separating two time-outcome pairs, the choice among the two depends on how close to the current period they are. LP also provided an axiomatic derivation of their generalized hyperbolic discount function, which we shall call the LP-discount function. A similar explanation of the CDE is provided in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) , 'PPL'for short. 4 The experimental work of Read (2001) con…rmed the CDE but rejected declining impatience in favour of constant impatience and, hence, rejected the LP (and PPL) explanation of the common di¤erence e¤ect in terms of declining impatience. Read (2001) and Scholten and Read (2006a) found experimental evidence for subadditivity and introduced the concept of an interval discount function 5 . Furthermore, based on empirical evidence, Scholten and Read (2006a) developed a speci…c interval discount function, which we shall call the RS-discount function. The RS-discount function (depending on parameter values) can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect as due to either declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of both. We shall refer to this work as collectively RRS. 6 Manzini and Mariotti (2006) , in their 'theory of vague time preferences', develop an attribute model that can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect; we review this in more detail in subsection 5.3, below.
Under uncertainty, the common di¤erence e¤ect never arises when we use expected utility with exponential discounting. Hence, it is quite possible that the experimental …nding of the common di¤erence e¤ect is a rejection of expected utility rather than exponential discounting. Halevy (2007) shows that when non-expected utility is combined with exponential discounting, the theory is consistent with the presence of a common di¤erence e¤ect, provided uncertainty is present but su¢ ciently small (see subsection 5.2, below).
The main explanation of non-additivity of time discounting is through the work of RRS and, in particular, using the interval discount function of Scholten and Read (2006a) . Intransitivity of time preferences can be incorporated either through a variety of attribute models (Rubinstein, 2003; Manzini and Mariotti, 2006 ). Yet another explanation relies on models that do not assume transitivity of preferences in the …rst place, such as Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) ; see subsection 5.4, below. However, it cannot account for either gain-loss asymmetry or delay-speedup asymmetry.
A problem, however, is that there is no single model that can explain all the anomalies.
aspire to? We suggest two desirable elements. First, it should be able to explain anomalies 1-6. Second, it should provide a framework that can incorporate recent developments in time discounting such as uncertainty (Halevy, 2007) and attribute models Mariotti, 2006 and Read, 2006b ). The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of intertemporal choice that incorporates the two desirable elements mentioned above. We call this theory the reference-time theory of intertemporal choice, 'RT'for short. It is a synthesis of three important works, namely, LP, PPL and RRS. In a nutshell, RT is basically LP extended to allow for non-additive time discounting by incorporating a reference point for time. Using RT, we explain the anomalies 1-6 as follows.
1. We follow LP in explaining the gain-loss asymmetry (anomaly 1) by assuming that the elasticity of the value function for losses exceeds the elasticity for gains. This allows us to use the same discount function for gains and losses, in agreement with strict separability of time and outcomes.
2. Also like LP, we explain the magnitude e¤ect (anomaly 2) by assuming that the elasticity of the value function is increasing. However, al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2008) show that several popular classes of utility functions violate this condition. They propose the class of simple increasing elasticity value functions (SIE) that is tractible and consistent with LP's explanation of the magnitude e¤ect. Furthermore, it is compatible with any theory where preferences are separable in time and outcomes. The SIE value function also satis…es LP's requirement that the elasticity of the value function for losses exceeds the elasticity for gains in order to explain the sign e¤ect. We follow al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2008) in using the SIE value function and integrating it within the RT theory.
3. LP provided an axiomatic derivation of their generalized hyperbolic discount function (which we call the LP-discount function). For this, they added the extra assumption of linear delay to that of the common di¤erence e¤ect. While there is considerable empirical evidence for the common di¤erence e¤ect, the assumption of linear delay is added purely for convenience. We extend the LP derivation as follows. At the most general level, which requires neither linear delay nor the common di¤erence e¤ect, we have our Representation Theorem 2 (Proposition 12, below). We introduce a weaker notion of subadditivity, which we call -subadditivity (De…nition 12, below). According to our Characterization Theorem 4 (Proposition 21, below), preferences exhibit the common di¤erence e¤ect if, and only if, -subadditivity holds. We also introduce a generalization of the concept of linear delay of LP. We call this -delay. Our Proposition 23, below, then shows that -delay implies the common di¤erence e¤ect. Imposing additivity, as well as -delay, gives our Proposition 24, below. The special case of the latter with = 1 gives the LP-discount function. Our more general approach also allows us to derive the RS-discount function (Proposition 25, below). In particular, as with RRS, we can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect (anomaly 3) as due to either declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of both. However, our approach is more general, as RT can also explain the common di¤erence e¤ect as due to the presence of a small amount of irremovable uncertainty, as in Halevy (2007) , or as a consequence of multiple decision criteria, as in Manzini and Mariotti (2006) (see section 5, below). Thus, RT can accommodate all the known explanations of the common di¤erence e¤ect. In the spirit of RRS, we leave it to empirical evidence to select the correct explanation.
4. We show the delay-speedup asymmetry (anomaly 4) follows from our other assumptions (see Proposition 29, below).
5. We follow LP in adopting prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as our underlying decision theory. But, in addition to a reference point for wealth, we introduce a reference point for time. If preferences are additive, as in LP, then the choice of the reference point for time is immaterial (Proposition 7, below). However, if preferences are non-additive, then the choice of the reference point for time matters. Thus, we can accommodate non-additive preferences (anomaly 5) by having a reference point for time. A consequence is that all our discount functions are interval discount functions, as in RRS.
6. Given a reference point for wealth, w 0 , and a reference point for time, r, our preferences are complete and transitive (subsection 2.2, below). Thus they may be called conditionally complete and conditionally transitive (conditional on w 0 and r). We explain observed intransitivity as due to a change in the reference point for time (see subsections 2.3 and 2.7, below). This is in contrast to Ok and Masatlioglu (subsection 5.4, below), where preferences are complete but intransitive (in our terminology we may describe such preferences as unconditionally complete but not even conditionally transitive). Thus the relative-discounting theory Ok and Masatlioglu and the reference-time theory of this paper are not compatible and neither is a special case of the other.
To summarize, the theory presented in this paper (reference-time theory or RT) can explain anomalies 1-6 (section, 4, below) and can be extended to incorporate uncertainty, as in Halevy (2007) , and the attribute models of Manzini and Mariotti (2006) and Scholten and Read (2006b) (section 5, below).
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
A reference-time theory of intertemporal choice (RT)
This section is structured as follows. We …rst outline prospect theory (subsection 2.1), which is an essential building block of RT. We de…ne preferences for RT as early as possible (subsection 2.2). This is followed by further essential material on discount functions, additivity, impatience, intransitivity and the common di¤erence e¤ect (subsections 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8). The main technical machinery: representation, extension and characterization theorems are developed in subsections 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. Finally, in subsection 2.12 we are in a position to extend LP to allow for non-additive time discounting by incorporating a reference point for time.
Prospect theory
We follow LP in using prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 , and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) rather than standard utility theory. Prospect theory distinguishes between two phases of decision making: editing and evaluation.
In the editing phase, a decision maker simpli…es a real world problem to make it amenable to formal analysis and reduce the associated cognitive load. As part of the editing phase a reference point is chosen to which outcomes are to be compared.
In the evaluation phase, a value (a real number) is attached to each feasible action by the decision maker. The action with highest value is chosen. The function, v, that assigns values to actions in prospect theory is called the value function, it is the analogue of the indirect utility function of standard utility theory. In standard utility theory carriers of utility are the outcomes of actions. But in prospect theory carriers of utility are deviations in outcomes from the reference point. In general, the action chosen in the evaluation phase will depend on the reference point chosen in the editing phase.
The value function, v, in prospect theory has four main properties: reference dependence, monotonicity, declining sensitivity, loss aversion. Furthermore, in prospect theory, there is non-linear transformation of probabilities. There is good empirical support for these feature; see, for instance, Kahneman and Tversky (2000) .
We take v to be the value function introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . Thus v satis…es:
v : ( 1; 1) ! ( 1; 1) is continuous, strictly increasing (monotonicity).
(2.1)
v (0) = 0 (reference dependence) and is twice di¤erentiable except at 0.
Following LP, we de…ne the elasticity of the value function as follows.
Preferences
We consider a decision maker who, at time t 0 , takes an action that results in the level of wealth w i at time t i , i = 1; 2; :::; n, where
Time r is the reference time: the time back to which all values are to be discounted. We can choose any moment of time as time zero and measure all other times relative to it. We choose to set t 0 = 0, i.e., the time a decision is made is always time t = 0. If it is desired to set t 0 6 = 0, then simply replace all times, t, below, with t t 0 . The decision maker's intertemporal utility function is given by:
where v is the value function introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . x i = w i w 0 is the di¤erence between the wealth level, w i , at time, t i , and the reference level for wealth, w 0 . D (r; t i ) is the discount function, it discounts v (x i ) from time, t i , back to the reference time, r. More formally, we assume that, for each (w 0 ; r) 2 ( 1; 1) [0; 1), the decision maker has a complete transitive preference relation, w 0 ;r on ( 1; 1) [r; 1). We think of w 0 as the reference point for wealth and r the reference point for time. If (w; t) 2 ( 1; 1) [r; 1), with w w 0 , we say that (w; t) is an outcome in the domain of gains. If (w; t) 2 ( 1; 1) [r; 1), with w < w 0 , we say that (w; t) is an outcome in the domain of losses. We assume that w 0 ;r is represented by a utility function v (w w 0 ) D (r; t). Thus (w 1 ; t 1 ) w 0 ;r (w 2 ; t 2 ) if, and only if,
Using (2.6), we extend w 0 ;r to a complete transitive preference relation on sequences from ( 1; 1) [r; 1), as follows 7 :
((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) w 0 ;r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n ))
, V r ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) V r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) (2.7)
We depart from LP in the following ways. LP have a reference point for wealth but not for time. We have a reference point for wealth, w 0 , and a reference point for time, r. LP implicitly assume that the discount function is additive (De…nition 5, below). We allow the discount function to be non-additive, to accommodate the empirical evidence of RRS. If the discount function is additive (as in LP), then the choice of the reference point for time is irrelevant, since (x; s) w 0 ;r (y; t) if, and only if, (x; s) w 0 ;0 (y; t) (Proposition 7, below). However, if the discount function is non-additive, then the choice of the reference point for time matters. We use this to explain (apparent) intransitivity as a framing e¤ect due to a change in the reference point for time.
Determination of the reference point for time
Let S be a non-empty set of sequences from ( 1; 1) [0; 1). Suppose a decision maker is interested in comparing the members of S. For example, for the purpose of choosing the optimal member (if S is compact). For this he needs a reference point for time. Let T be the set of times involved, i.e., T = ft 2 [0; 1) : t = t i for some sequence f(x 1 ; t 1 ) ; (x 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (x i ; t i ) ; :::g in Sg . (2.8) Since T is bounded below (by 0) and non-empty, it follows that T has a greatest lower bound, r. We make the following tentative assumption:
A0 Reference time. Given S, T , r, as described just above, we assume that the decision maker takes r as the reference point for time.
For example, if a decision maker wants to compare x received at time s with y received at time t, s t, then S consists of just two sequences, each with just one element: S = f(x; s) ; (y; t)g and T = fs; tg. Thus A0 implies that r = s. If v (x) < v (y) D (s; t) then the decision maker chooses (y; t) over (x; s).
A0 does not have the status of the LP assumptions A1-A4, introduced in subsection 2.12, below. While there is considerable, though debated, empirical evidence for A1-A4, A0 should be regarded as a tentative assumption, whose implications are to be explored. We will only use A0 in subsections 2.7 and 2.12. In subsection 2.7, we use A0 to explain (apparent) intransitivity as due to a shift in the reference point for time. In subsection 2.12, we use A0 to prove that assumption A4 (Delay-speedup asymmetry) follows from the other assumptions (Proposition 29).
Discount functions
The …ve discount functions that will be important for this paper are:
PPL: D (r; t) = The exponential discount function (2.9) was introduced by Samuelson (1937) . Aside from its tractability, the main attraction of EDU is that it leads to time-consistent choices. If the plan (x 1 ; t 1 ) ; (x 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (x n ; t n ) is optimal at time 0, then at time t k the plan (x k+1 ; t k+1 ) ; (x k+2 ; t k+2 ) ; :::; (x n ; t n ) is also optimal. But this may no longer be true for more general speci…cations of the discount function.
The (or quasi-hyperbolic) discount function (2.10) was proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Laibson (1997) . The generalized hyperbolic discount function (2.11) was proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) . For the special case, = , (2.11) it reduces to the hyperbolic discount function. These three discount functions are additive (De…nition 3, below). They can account for the common di¤erence e¤ect through declining impatience (De…nition 6, below) but they cannot account for either non-additivity or intransitivity.
The interval discount function (2.12) was introduced by Scholten and Read (2006a) . It can account for both non-additivity and intransitivity. It can account for the common di¤erence e¤ect though declining impatience, subadditivity or a combination of both (subsections 2.7 and 2.8, below).
In subsection 5.1, below, we shall show that the attribute model of Scholten and Read (2006b ) is equivalent to a discounted utility model with the discount function (2.13), which is a generalization of their RS-discount function (2.12).
Note that (2.11) approaches (2.9) as ! 0. In general, neither of (2.11) or (2.12) is a special case of the other. However, for r = 0 (and only for r = 0), (2.12) reduces to (2.11) when = = 1. Scholten and Read (2006a) report incorrectly that the LP-discount function is a special case of the RS-discount function. One needs to restrict r = 0 (in addition to = = 1) in order to generate the LP from the RS-discount function. While ; are parameters, r is a variable. Hence, neither discount function is a special case of the other. Our terminology suggests that a continuous discount function is continuous. That this is partly true, is established by the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 : A continuous discount function, D (r; t), is continuous in t.
Proposition 2 : Each of (2.9), (2.11) and (2.12) is a continuous discount function in the sense of De…nition 2. However, (2.10) is a discount function but not a continuous discount function.
The reason that (2.10) fails to be a continuous discount function is that lim
From (2.11) and (2.12) we see that the restrictions r 0 and t 0 are needed. From (2.12) we see that the further restriction r t is needed.
8 From (2.9) we see that the 'into'
in De…nition 2(ii) cannot be strengthened to 'onto'. 
Additivity
We now de…ne additivity and related concepts.
Additivity (2.15) implies that discounting a quantity from time t back to time s and then further back to time r is the same as discounting that quantity from time t back to time r in one step.
To aid further development, we de…ne a generating function, whose interpretation will become apparent from Proposition 5 that follows the de…nition. A 'continuous generating function' is continuous. The proof is the same as that of Proposition 1 and, therefore, will be omitted.
1 ' (t) for some strictly decreasing real valued function, ' : ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) w 0 ;r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n ))
, ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) w 0 ;0 ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) .
Thus, if the discount function is additive (as is the case with LP) then the choice of the reference time, r, back to which all utilities are discounted, is irrelevant. Discounting back to time r is equivalent to discounting back to time 0.
Impatience
The following concepts are also useful. > 0 implies subadditivity (incorrect), > 1 implies superadditivity (incorrect) and 0 < < 1 implies declining impatience (correct but incomplete). Proposition 8 clari…es these points.
In the light of Proposition 8, we can now see the interpretation of the parameters and in the RS-discount function (2.12).
controls impatience, independently of the values of the other parameters , and : 0 < < 1, gives declining impatience, = 1 gives constant impatience and > 1gives increasing impatience. If 0 < 1, then we get subadditivity, irrespective of the values of the other parameters , and . However, if > 1, then (2.12) can be neither subadditive, additive nor superadditive (depending on the particular values of r, s and t, we may have D (r; s) < D (r + t; s + t), D (r; s) = D (r + t; s + t) or D (r; s) > D (r + t; s + t)).
Intransitive preferences: Real or apparent?
Consider the following hypothetical situation. A decision maker prefers a payo¤ of 1 now to a payo¤ of 2 next period, i.e., (2, next period) (1, now). The decision maker also prefers a payo¤ of 2 next period to a payo¤ of 3 two periods from now, i.e., (3, 2 two periods from now) (2, next period). Finally, the same decision maker prefers a payo¤ of 3 two periods from now to a payo¤ of 1 now, i.e., (1, now) (3, 2 two periods from now). Schematically:
(1, now) (3, 2 two periods from now) (2, next period) (1, now) .
(2.21)
Ok and Masatlioglu (2007, p215) use a similar example to motivate their intransitive theory of relative discounting. Alternatively, we may view (2.21) as due to a framing e¤ect resulting in a shift in the reference point for time. Assume that the choice of reference time in each pairwise comparison is the sooner of the two dates, in conformity with Assumption A0, subsection 2.3. Then (2.21) can be formalized as follows.
Thus, the decision maker prefers a payo¤ of 1 now to a payo¤ of 2 next period, both discounted back to the present. The decision maker also prefers a payo¤ of 2 next period to a payo¤ of 3 the following period, both discounted back to next period. Finally, the decision maker prefers a payo¤ of 3 in two periods from now to a payo¤ of 1 now, both discounted back to the present. If this view is accepted, then the apparent intransitivity in (2.21) arises from con ‡ating V 0 (3; 2) with V 1 (3; 2) and V 1 (2; 1) with V 0 (2; 1). The following example shows that (2.22) is consistent with a reference-time theory of intertemporal choice.
Example 1 : Take the reference point for wealth be the current level of wealth, so each payo¤ is regarded as a gain to current wealth. Take the value function to be As our discount function we take the Read-Scholten discount function (2.12) with = = 1 and = = 
From (2.27) to (2.31), we get
con…rming (2.22).
A consequence of Proposition 7 is that no additive discount function (e.g., exponential (2.9), PPL (2.10) or LP (2.11)) can explain (apparently) intransitive choices as exhibited in (2.21). The reason is that, under the conditions of that proposition, all utilities can be discounted back to time zero and, hence, can be compared and ordered.
The common di¤erence e¤ect: Declining impatience or subadditivity?
Let us reconsider the common di¤erence e¤ect, using Thaler's apples example (anomaly 3 in the list of subsection 1.1). A decision maker prefers one apple today to two apples tomorrow, so that
However, the decision maker, today, prefers to receive two apples in 51 days' time to receiving one apple in 50 days'time, so that We compare the resolution of the 'common di¤erence e¤ect' anomaly under the LPdiscount function (2.11) and the RS-discount function (2.12). To simplify as much as possible, choose the parameters: = = = = 1. We shall use these parameters in other examples too. We tabulate the relevant magnitudes below:
Recall that the decision maker prefers one apple today to two apples tomorrow if, and only if,
On the other hand, the decision maker, today, prefers to receive two apples in 51 days' time to receiving one apple in 50 days'time if, and only if,
Substituting from the above table and (2.37) into (2.38) and (2.39) gives, respectively,
for both the LP-discount function and the RS-discount function. This illustrates that both approaches can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect. However, they explain in very di¤erent ways. Comparing rows one and four of the table, we see that the LP-discount function exhibits declining impatience, D (0; 1) = = D (0; 50) D (50; 51). Thus, the LP-discount function explains the common di¤erence e¤ect as exclusively due to declining impatience, while the RS-discount function explains this e¤ect as due (in this example, exclusively) to subadditivity. More generally, and provided 0 < 1, the RS-discount function can combine subadditivity with declining impatience (0 < < 1), constant impatience ( = 1) or increasing impatience ( > 1).
Of course, and as Read (2001) pointed out, the common di¤erence e¤ect could be due to both declining impatience and subadditivity. Read (2001) , conducted a series of experiments that tested for the common di¤erence e¤ect and could also discriminate between subadditivity and declining impatience. He found support for the common di¤erence e¤ect and for subadditivity but rejected declining impatience in favour of constant impatience. Read (2001) also discusses the psychological foundation for subadditivity.
Representation theorems
Suppose that x received at time 0 is equivalent to y received at time t (when both are discounted back to time 0), so that v (x) = v (y) D (0; t). Suppose that the receipt of x is delayed to time s. We ask, at what time, T , will y received at time T be equivalent to x received at time s s; t) ), s 0, t 0. Then we call a delay function corresponding to the discount function, D. We also say that the discount function, D, exhibits -delay.
Proposition 9 (Properties of a delay function): Let D be a discount function and a corresponding delay function. Then has the following properties: (a) is unique, (b) (s; t) is strictly increasing in each of s and t, (c) (s; t) = (t; s),
Suppose that x received at time 0 is equivalent to y received at time t (when both are discounted back to time 0), so that v (x) = v (y) D (0; t). Suppose that the receipt of x is delayed to time s. Then, according to Proposition 9(e), the delay function, (s; t), if it exists, gives the time to which the receipt of y has to be deferred, so as to retain equivalence to x (when both are discounted back to time 0). Therefore, we called a delay function.
Proposition 10 (Existence of a delay function): A continuous discount function has a unique delay function.
We now introduce our fourth de…ned function (the others were: the discount function, the generating function and the delay function). A 'continuous seed function'is continuous. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and, therefore, will be omitted.
The following de…nition gives a useful representation for discount functions. (c) (
From Proposition 11, we see that if is to be the delay function of some continuous discount function, then it must take the form given in part (c) of that proposition. In the light of this, when considering possible delay functions, we can restrict ourselves, without loss of generality, to the class of functions of the form (s; t)
, where is as in part (a), i.e., a continuous seed function.
The following proposition is a generalization of LP's derivation of their generalized hyperbolic discount function. A 'continuous extension function', f (r; t), is continuous in t. The proof is the same as that of Proposition 1 and, therefore, will be omitted. De…nition 10 de…nes extension functions independently of any discount function. By contrast, De…nition 11 de…nes an extension function corresponding to a give discount function. Our terminology suggests that 'an extension function corresponding to a given discount function' is, in fact, 'an extension function'. That this is indeed the case, is established in the following proposition.
Proposition To summarize, given a generating function, ', and an extension function, f , by Extension Theorem 3 (Proposition 15), we can construct a discount function D so that D (r; t) is the f -extension of ' (t) = D (0; t). Extension Theorem 2 (Proposition 14) tells us that all continuous discount functions are obtainable in this way from continuous generating functions and continuous extension functions.
Characterization theorems
We can combine the representation and extension theorems of the previous two subsections to produce further useful results, which we now turn to.
Proposition 16
Proposition 19 : The following two tables give a seed function, , the generating function, ', the extension function, f , and the delay function, , of each of the discount functions D (r; t) (2.9) to (2.12).
Starting with a continuous seed function, , an > 0 and a > 0, we can 'grow'from them a unique generating function, ' (t) = [1 + (t)] (which turns out to be continuous). Given this generating function and a continuous extension function, f (r; t), we obtain a unique discount function D (r; t) = ' (f (r; t)) = [1 + (f (r; t))] (which also turns out to be continuous). This discount function determines a unique delay function,
. For example, the LP-discount function D (r; t) = (1 + r) (1 + t) , > 0, > 0, has, obviously, the representation D (0; t) = (1 + t) (with (t) = t) and, hence, the delay function (s; t) = s + t + st. But it also has many other representations:
Since the delay function, , but not the seed function, , is uniquely determined by D, it is better to say that D exhibits delay rather than delay.
Assumptions and consequences
LP introduce four assumptions, all with good experimental support (LP, II pp574-578). We adapt these assumption to allow for discount functions that are not, necessarily, additive. Under this condition, the reference point for time becomes important (Proposition 7). Let the discount function, D, be given by:
where and f are, respectively, the seed and extension functions. If D is a continuous discount function then it can always be represented in the form (2.42), where is a continuous seed function and f is a continuous extension function. Moreover, f is determined uniquely by D (Characterization Theorem 1 (Proposition 16)). Furthermore, under the assumption of continuity, D will have a unique delay functions, (Propositions 9 and 10 and Representation Theorem 1 (Proposition 11)), and is given by:
Assumptions A1 to A4, below, correspond to anomalies 1 to 4, above (subsection 1.1). Thus, what is regarded as anomalous behavior from the neoclassical point of view is at the core of the RT theory.
Given a discount function, D (r; t), the assumption A1 to A4, below, place restrictions only on D (0; t), i.e., only on discounting from an arbitrary time, t 0, back to time zero. Hence, to derive results for D (r; t), further assumptions are needed. In particular, for Proposition 24 we assume that D (r; t) is an additive extension of D (0; t), while for Proposition 25 we assume that D (r; t) is an f -extension of D (0; t) for f (r; t) = (t r )
1
.
A1 Gain-loss asymmetry. If 0 < x < y and
A4 Delay-speedup asymmetry. For c > 0, s > 0 and t > 0, V 0 ((0; 0) ; (c; s) ; ( c; s + t)) < V 0 ((0; 0) ; ( c; s) ; (c; s + t)).
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De…nition 12 ( -subadditivity): Let > 0. A function, , is -subadditive if, for all s and t for which is de…ned and non-zero: (s + t) < (s) + (t) + (s) (t).
A function, , is subadditive (in the standard sense) if, for all s and t for which is de…ned: (s + t) (s) + (t). A function that is -subadditive, for some > 0, need not be subadditive. However, a function is subadditive if, and only if, it is -subadditive for all > 0. 14 13 A4 is to be understood as follows. In the LHS of the inequality, the reference stream of the decision maker is 0; 0; c (for dates 0; s; s+t) i.e. a reward is contractually promised at time s+t > 0: The individual is then o¤ered a choice to receive the reward early, at time s (speedup). Given the assumption on reference time, in A0, the income stream, relative to reference wealth, 0; c; c, can be explained as follows: The individual was not expecting anything at times 0 and s so relative to reference wealth, he gets 0 0; c 0 at times 0 and s: Having received a reward of c at time s; his reference wealth is c: Hence, at time t + s his wealth relative to the reference wealth is 0 c = c: For the RHS of the inequality, the contractually promised income stream is 0; c; 0 (for dates 0; s; s + t): The individual is then told that the reward will now instead be available only at time s + t (delay). Proceeding as before, the stream of income relative to the reference point is now 0; c; c.
14 Similarly, a function, , is additive (in the standard sense) if, for all s and t for which is de…ned: (s + t) = (s) + (t). Consider the exponential discount function, D (r; t) = e (t r) , > 0. Then ln D (0; t) is additive in this sense. And, of course, D (r; t) is additive in the sense of De…nition 3. Also note that -subaddivity, as in De…nition 12, neither implies nor is implied by subadditivity of the discount function, as in De…nition 3. In particular, if = 1, we say that preferences exhibit linear delay.
A delay function, if it exists, is unique (Proposition 9) and it always exists for a continuous discount function (Proposition 10). Hence, De…nition 13 is a sound de…nition. However, it should be remembered that -delay is a property of the delay function, , not of the seed function, (see discussion at end of subsection 2.11).
Proposition 22 : If preferences exhibit -delay, then they also exhibit the common difference e¤ect. . (b) The value function is more elastic for losses than for gains:
Proposition 27 (LP, p584): For a continuous discount function, A2 implies that the value function is (a) subproportional: (0 < x < y or y < x < 0) )
, for a > 1, (b) more elastic for outcomes of larger absolute magnitude: (0 < x < y or y < x < 0) )
Intuitively, increasing elasticity of the value function implies greater sensitivity of v to increases in x. This in turn increases the weight of larger outcomes (D (r; t) v(x t )) in intertemporal plans. A similar intuition applies to the result in Proposition 26(b).
We now add the standard assumption from prospect theory that the value function is strictly concave for gains and strictly convex for losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ): A5 Declining sensitivity. For x > 0, v 00 (x) < 0 (strict concavity for gains). For x < 0, v 00 (x) > 0 (strict convexity for losses).
Combining A5 with Proposition 27 we get:
Proposition 28 : A2 and A5 imply that 0 < v < 1.
Proposition 29 : Assumption A4 (delay-speedup asymmetry) follows from assumptions A0 (reference time) and A1 (gain-loss asymmetry).
Simple increasing elasticity value functions (SIE)
A natural question that arises is 'Is the RT theory developed in section 2 consistent?' A related question is 'Is there a tractable functional form for the value function which can be combined with RT theory to produce a useful model?' We address these questions in this section. In subsection 3.2, below, we answer the second question in the a¢ rmative. We call the value function developed there a simple increasing elasticity (SIE) value function. Our a¢ rmative answer to the second question also provides an a¢ rmative answer to the …rst question. But …rst, in subsection 3.1, immediately below, we show that none of several popular families of functions is compatible with RT theory or, indeed, any theory (e.g., LP) that attempts to explain the magnitude e¤ect on the basis of increasing elasticity of the value function.
Decreasing elasticity of HARA utility functions
We consider several popular classes of value functions:
1. Constant relative risk aversion functions (CRRA)
2. Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion functions (HARA) 17 v (x) = 1
3. Constant absolute risk aversion functions (CARA) 16 The general restriction is that 6 = 1. However, we need the stronger restriction, 0 < < 1, in order to satisfy Proposition 28. 17 The general restrictions are > 0, +
> 0, 6 = 1. Since we allow x 2 [0; 1), the restriction
> 0 implies that > 0 and > 0. We then also need < 1 in order to satisfy Proposition 28.
Note that, traditionally, the HARA class is de…ned by v (x) = 1 + 
Simple increasing elasticity utility functions (SIE)
Consider the value function
It may be interesting to note that (3.6) is a product of a CRRA function, x , and a HARA function, 1 + x 1 . Proposition 31, below, establishes that the value function (3.6) is compatible with Propositions 26, 27 and 28.
Proposition 31 : From (3.6) it follows that (a) v : 
Explaining the anomalies
Here, we put together the results of sections 2 and 3.
Proposition 32 : Each of the four discount functions (2.10), (2.11), (2.12) with 1 and 1, and (2.13), when combined with the SIE value function (3.6), satis…es assumptions A0 to A5, i.e., all the assumptions.
A summing up
To sum up so far, the PPL-discount function (2.10), the LP-discount function (2.11) and the RS-discount function (2.12) can all explain the common di¤erence e¤ect. But they explain it in di¤erent ways. The PPL (2.10) and LP (2.11) discount functions explain the common di¤erence e¤ect with declining impatience. For PPL, there is a sudden drop in impatience from time t = 0 to times t > 0, with impatience being constant for all times t > 0. For LP, on the other hand, the decline in impatience is continuous (recall Example 2). By contrast, the RS-discount function (2.12), on account of its subadditivity (for 0 < 1) can explain the common di¤erence whether we have declining impatience (0 < < 1), constant impatience ( = 1) or increasing impatience ( > 1), provided 1 (recall Proposition 8 and Example 2). On the other hand, none of the discount functions (2.9), (2.10) or (2.11) can explain (apparent) intransitive preferences such as that exhibited by (2.21), recall Proposition 7 and subsection 2.7.
Thus, it emerges that of discount functions (2.9), (2.10), (2.11) and (2.12), the RSdiscount function (2.12) is the most satisfactory because, when combined with the SIE value function, reference time/wealth, it can explain all the anomalies: gain-loss asymmetry, the magnitude e¤ect, the common di¤erence e¤ect, delay-speedup asymmetry as well as subadditivity and (apparent) intransitivity.
Alternatives and extensions
In this section we compare the reference-time theory (RT) of section 2 with four recent developments.
First, we consider the tradeo¤ model of intertemporal choice of Scholten and Read (2006b), SR for short. We will argue that SR's tradeo¤ criterion can be represented by a discount function. Hence, it can be incorporated within RT. The gain is that their psychological arguments for their tradeo¤ model give support for RT theory and, in particular, their own RS-discount function.
The second development we consider is Halevy (2007) , H for short, who shows that the common di¤erence e¤ect is compatible with exponential discounting, provided subjects are non-expected utility maximizers and exhibit the certainty e¤ect. The certainty e¤ect was …rst proposed as an explanation of the Allais paradox: subjects are much more sensitive to a change from certainty to uncertainty than they are to changes in the middle range of probabilities.
The third is the theory of vague time preferences of Manzini and Mariotti (2006) , MM for short. Again, they can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect without departing from exponential discounting. However, we believe that the importance of H and MM far transcends their ability to explain the common di¤erence e¤ect. On the other hand, and because in their present formulations they do not include any reference dependence, they are unable to explain gain-loss asymmetry, delay-speedup asymmetry, subadditivity and (apparent) intransitivity. By contrast, RT theory can explain all the anomalies. Nevertheless, we believe that it is desirable, and easy, to extend RT theory to incorporate uncertainty, as in H, and multiple criteria, as in MM. We show this, below, in the context of simple examples.
The fourth recent development we discuss here is the theory of intransitive preferences and relative discounting of Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) , OM for short. This is the most radical of all the theories considered so far. From the outset it neither assumes transitivity nor additivity and, hence, is compatible with these two phenomena. In its present formulation, it cannot account for either gain-loss asymmetry or delay-speedup asymmetry. Furthermore, the lack of transitivity will make it hard to work with this theory, as the authors themselves explain. On the other hand, these problems can all be resolved in the special case of a transitive preference relation. But then their model becomes additive. In this case, OM would reduce to a standard discounting model.
Finally, all …ve theories (SR, H, MM, OM and RT) can explain the magnitude e¤ect, when combined with the SIE value function (3.6).
The tradeo¤ model of intertemporal choice
Read and Scholten's critique of discounting models, including their own, led them to develop their tradeo¤ model of intertemporal choice (Read and Scholten, 2006) . It is worth quoting their abstract in full:
"Research on intertemporal judgement and choices between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later outcome has revealed many anomalies to the discountedutility model. Attempts to account for these anomalies within the discounting paradigm have resulted in convoluted and psychologically opaque models. We therefore develop a new model of intertemporal choice, the tradeo¤ model, in which choice results from a tradeo¤ between the perceived time di¤erence (interval) and the perceived outcome di¤erence (compensation). This model is both more parsimonious and more intuitive than any rival discounting model of comparable scope. Moreover, it accurately describes archival data as well as data from new experiments."
We argue that the tradeo¤ model of Scholten and Read (2006b) can be incorporated within RT-theory. If this is accepted, then their tradeo¤ model lends further support to the RT-theory and, in particular, their own discount function (2.12) and its generalization (2.13), above.
We proceed by …rst recasting their model in a more general form (and indicate how their model is to be obtained as a special case). However, there should be no presumption that they would agree with our reformulation. They develop their model through three successive versions. We concentrate on their fourth and …nal version, page 15.
Let r 0 be the reference point for time. 19 The tradeo¤ model establishes preference relationships, r and r between outcome pairs (x; s) and (y; t). Thus (x; s) r (y; t) if, and only if, y received at time t is strictly preferred to x received at time s. Similarly, (x; s) r (y; t) if, and only if, y received at time t is equivalent to x received at time s. These relationship are established using three functions, a value function, u, a tradeo¤ function Q and a delay-perception function, w. We make the following assumptions: Q :
is strictly increasing (the same as in (2.13), above). 20 First, let x > 0, y > 0 and s r 0, t r. Then:
Second, let x < 0, y < 0 and (as before) s r 0, t r. Then:
For completeness, we also need (again, s r 0, t r):
To get the tradeo¤ model of Read and Scholten, set r = s in the above equations.
21 19 To ease the burden of notation, we shall suppress reference to the reference point for wealth, w 0 . Thus, in what follows, we write r and r when we should have written r;w0 and r;w0 , respectively. 20 They explicitly state two assumptions: Q 0 > 0, Q 00 < 0. However, in the next paragraph, they say that Q 00 > 0 for su¢ ciently small intervals. So, we make no assumptions on Q 00 . They explicitly state no further assumptions on Q and w. However, we believe our other assumptions on Q and w are in line with what they intend (see their equations (2) and (5) for the earlier, and simpler, versions of their model). 21 They explicitly state only (5.1) and (5.3) (with r = s). However, we believe that our other equations are in line with their framework.
To de…ne a discount function, D, that expresses these preferences, let
Then all the above relations, (5.1) to (5.8), can be summarized by the following. For all x; y and all r, s, t such that s r 0, t r:
(5.12) (5.11) and (5.12) suggest we take our discount function to be the generalized RS function (2.13), which is a generalization of the discount function (2.12) of Scholten and Read (2006a) . Thus, RT-theory can incorporate the tradeo¤ model.
The certainty e¤ect
A test of a theory (T) is always a test of T plus auxiliary assumptions (O)
. Thus, a refutation of T&O may be a refutation of O rather than T. However, since O is often left implicit, a refutation of T&O may be misconstrued as a refutation of T rather than O. A case in point may be T = 'exponential discounting' and O = 'uncertainty is not relevant'. In testing the common di¤erence e¤ect, not only is it better if subjects are paid 'real money', the delays should be realistic too, i.e., quite long. Despite the experimenters' best e¤orts to eliminate uncertainty, there will always be a residual risk that the subjects will not receive their promised payo¤s. If subjects were expected utility (EU) maximizers, then risk would not matter (Example 3, below). However, if subjects overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (as in many non-EU theories), then risk matters (Example 4, below). Moreover, the lower the residual risk the greater will be its e¤ect! (Example 5, below.) 22 Thus, Halevy (2007) argues that the common di¤erence e¤ect may, in fact, be a refutation of EU rather than exponential discounting. The above points are illustrated by the following three examples. They all involve a choice between receiving $1000 now or $1100 next year and, simultaneously, a choice between receiving these two sums 10 and 11 years from now, respectively. We use the SIE value function (3.6), so that v (1000) = 1000:5 and v (1100) = 1100:5.
(5.13)
Let the discount function be D (s; t) and the probability weighting function be w (p), where p is the probability that the payo¤ will actually be paid one year from now. We assume independence across years so that the probability of receiving the payo¤ t years from now is p t . Let (x; t) be the event $x is received in year t and let (x; s) (y; t) mean (y; t) is strictly preferred to (x; s). We take the current level of wealth, w 0 , and present time, r = 0, to be the reference points for wealth and time, respectively (and, to simplify notation, we have dropped the subscripts, w 0 ; r, from w 0 ;r ). We thus have:
No common di¤erence e¤ect: (1100; 1) (1000; 0) ) (1100; 11) (1000; 10) (5.14) From (5.17) and (5.19) we see that (1100; 1) (1000; 0) , (1100; 11) (1000; 10). Thus, exponential discounting together with expected utility 23 imply no common di¤erence e¤ect.
Hence, the observation of a common di¤erence e¤ect is a rejection of the joint hypothesis of exponential discounting and expected utility. Thus, it would imply the rejection of one or the other (or both) but not, necessarily, exponential discounting.
Example 4 (Exponential discounting with non-expected utility): We take cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) as our model of non-expected utility. Take D (r; t) = e (t r) , = 0:04, and w (p) = e ( ln p) (Prelec, 1998) A calculation shows that the inequality of the right hand side of (5.20) holds while the corresponding inequality in (5.21) does not hold. Hence, (1100; 1) (1000; 0) but (1100; 11) (1000; 10). Thus, exponential discounting may be consistent with an observation of a common di¤erence e¤ect, if subjects do not behave according to expected utility. A calculation shows that the inequality of the right hand side of (5.22) holds and also the corresponding inequality in (5.23). Hence, (1100; 1) (1000; 0) and (1100; 11) (1000; 10). Thus, the common di¤erence e¤ect is due to the certainty e¤ect in particular, rather than uncertainty as such.
Example 5 suggests that if the common di¤erence e¤ect is due to the certainty e¤ect alone, rather than a combination of the certainty e¤ect and non-exponential discounting, then the phenomenon should disappear for probabilities around 0:4.
Vague time preferences
Manzini and Mariotti (2006) develop a theory of vague time preferences and discuss the psychological foundations for such an approach. The intuition behind this theory is that the choice between, say, receiving $1000 now and $1100 next year is clearer than the choice between these two sums received 10 and 11 years from now, respectively. MM propose three criteria to choose between (x; t) and (y; s). The primary criterion is to choose whichever has the highest present utility value. If the two present values are not 'signi…cantly'di¤erent, then the subject chooses the one with the highest monetary value (secondary criteria). If they have the same monetary values, so that the secondary criterion fails, then the subject behaves according to the third criterion: 'choose the outcome that is delivered sooner'. If all three criteria fail, then the subject is indi¤erent. Thus, MM achieve a complete, though intransitive, ordering. In particular, indi¤erence here is not an equivalence relationship. Suppose that two present values are signi…cantly di¤erent if their di¤erence is greater than , where is positive real number. Then we can state these criteria formally as follows. (x; t) w 0 ;r (y; s) if, and only if, one of the following holds 24 :
, and x < y, or 3. jv (y) D (r; s) v (x) D (r; t)j , x = y and s < t.
Obviously, if x and y are vectors, then extra criteria can be added. Utility values whose di¤erence is less than are regarded as not signi…cantly di¤erent. This could be because, for example, the decision maker is not sure of the appropriate value function or discount function to use. Therefore, the decision maker does not want the decision to depend too critically on the choice of these functions. On the other hand, the decision maker might be absolutely sure that more is better than less and sooner is better than later. Example 6, below, shows how this theory can explain the common di¤erence e¤ect.
Example 6 : Consider the choice between receiving $1000 now and $1100 next year and the choice between these two sums received 10 and 11 years from now, respectively. As with the examples in subsection 5.2, we use the SIE value function (3.6), so that 5.13 holds. We use the exponential discount function (2.9) with = 0:1 and the reference time r = 0, D (0; t) = e 0:1t . We take = 3, so that present utility values whose di¤erence is less than 3 are regarded as not signi…cantly di¤erent. Using these values, we get v (1000) v (1100) e 0:1 = 1000:5 1100:5e 0:1 = 4: 726 4 > 3. Hence, the primary criterion holds and the decision maker prefers $1000 now to $1100 next year. Next, jv (1100) e 1:1 v (1000) e 1 j = j1100:5e
1:1 1000:5e 1 j = 1: 738 8 < 3. Hence, the primary criterion fails, and the decision maker considers the second criterion. Since 1000 < 1100, the second criterion holds. The decision maker prefers $1100 received 11 years from now to $1000 received 10 years from now. We have an illustration of the common di¤erence e¤ect.
Recall, from subsection 2.7 above, that the experimental results of Roelofsma and Read (2000) supported 'sooner is better than larger'against 'larger is better than sooner'. However, if the order of the secondary criteria is reversed, so that sooner is better than larger (in agreement with the experimental results of Roelofsma and Reed, 2000) , then $1000 received 10 years from now would be better than $1100 received 11 years from now, and we would not get a common di¤erence e¤ect.
However, whether MM's explanation of the common di¤erence e¤ect is acceptable or not, to us the main contribution of their paper lies in the use of primary and secondary criteria. This appears to us to be a more accurate description of actual decision making compared to the assumption of a single criterion.
Intransitive preferences and relative discounting
Ok and Masatlioglu (2007) (henceforth OM) accommodate (apparent) intransitivity, such as (2.21), by regarding it as real. Thus, they develop a theory of intransitive time preferences. At time 0, a decision maker has a binary relationship, , on the set = X [0; 1), where X is a non-empty set. Let x; y 2 X and s; t 2 [0; 1), then (x; s) (y; t) is to be interpreted as 'y received at time t is (weakly) preferred to x received at time s'. Let and be the symmetric and asymmetric parts of , respectively. For each t 2 [0; 1), t is the t-th time projection of onto X, i.e., x t y, if, and only if, (x; t) (y; t). In particular, 0 is the projection of onto X at time 0 (and, similarly, for t and t ).
If X is a metric space, then further structure can be imposed on . In particular (OM, p218): De…nition 14 (time preferences): Let X be a metric space, then is a time preference on if (i) is complete and continuous, (ii) 0 is complete and transitive, (iii) t = 0 for each t 2 [0; 1).
In De…nition 14, note that transitivity is imposed on 0 (and, hence, also on t ) but transitivity is not imposed on . Hence, neither nor are, necessarily, transitive. In particular, is not, in general, an equivalence relationship.
Let R be the set of real numbers, R + the set of non-negative reals and R ++ the set of positive reals. Recall that a homeomorphism is a mapping that is 1-1, onto, continuous and its inverse is also continuous. Then 24) while (i) for given s, D (s; t) is decreasing in t with D (s; 1) = 0, and (ii) D (t; s) = 1=D (s; t).
Suppose s t. Then (5.24) says that y received at time t is (weakly) preferred to x received at time s if, and only if, the (undated) utility of x is less or equal to the (undated) utility of y discounted from time t back to time s by the discount factor D (s; t). In this case, part (i) of Proposition 33 implies the following. Fix the time, s, at which x is received. Let the time, t, at which y is received, recede into the future. Then the value of the utility of y, discounted back to time s, decreases. In the limit, as the receipt of y is inde…nitely postponed, the value of its utility, discounted back to time s, approaches zero. Part (ii) of Proposition 33 says that compounding forward, from time s to time t, is the inverse of discounting backwards from time t to time s.
For each r 2 [0; 1), let r be the restriction of to X [r; 1), i.e., to times t r.
Thus, for r s and r t, (x; s) r (y; t) if, and only if, (x; s) (y; t).
We can now point to the main di¤erences between RT and OM. First, note that U in Proposition 33 can take only positive values while v in (2.1)-(2.2) takes both positive and negative values. 26 To bypass this problem, we consider only the domain of strictly positive gains. Let w 0 be the reference point for wealth. Take X = fw w 0 : w > w 0 g = (0; 1) and let satisfy the conditions of Proposition 33. Let (U; D) be the representation of guaranteed by that Proposition. From subsection 2.2 recall that, for each r 2 [0; 1), w 0 ;r is a complete transitive order on ( 1; 1) [r; 1) and, hence, also on X [r; 1). The second point we wish to make is that, in general, w 0 ;r , unlike r , is not the restriction to X [r; 1) of some complete binary relationship on X [0; 1). Thus OM and RT are not compatible and neither is a special case of the other. Third, w 0 ;r is transitive while, in general, r is not transitive. To elaborate this point, consider (x; r), (y; s) and (z; t), where x; y; z 2 X and s; t 2 [r; 1). Suppose (x; r) w 0 ;r (y; s) and (y; s) w 0 ;r (z; t). Since w 0 ;r is transitive, we can conclude that (x; r) w 0 ;r (z; t). Now, suppose that (x; r) r (y; s) and (y; s) r (z; t). Since r is not, in general, transitive, we cannot conclude that (x; r) r (z; t). 27 More generally, given a compact subset C X [r; 1), there is no guarantee in OM that it has a maximum under r (i.e., an m 2 C such that c r m for all c 2 C). This, obviously, will cause great di¢ culty for any economic theory formulated in the OM framework. On the other hand, in RT theory, and if D is continuous, C will always have a maximum under w 0 ;r . Fourth, and …nally, these problems with OM can all be resolved in the special case where is transitive. But then would also be additive. In this case, OM would reduce to the standard discounting model.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Let r 2 [0; 1) and t 2 [r; 1). Let ft n g 1 n=1 be a sequence in [r; 1) converging to t. We want to show that fD (r; t n )g 1 n=1 converges to D (r; t). It is su¢ cient to show that any monotone subsequence of fD (r; t n )g 1 n=1 converges to D (r; t). In particular, let fD (r; t n i )g 1 i=1 be a decreasing subsequence of fD (r; t n )g 1 n=1 .
Since fD (r; t n i )g 1 i=1 is bounded below by D (r; t), it must converge to, say, q, where D (r; t) q D (r; t n i ), for all i. Since D is onto, there is a p 2 [r; 1) such that D (r; p) = q. Moreover, t n i p t, for each i. Suppose D (r; t) < q. Then t n i < p, for each i. Hence also t n i < t, for each i. But this cannot be, since ft n i g 1 i=1 , being a subsequence of the convergent sequence ft n g 1 n=1 , must also converge to the same limit, t. Hence, D (r; t) = q. Hence, fD (r; t n i )g 1 i=1 converges to D (r; t). Similarly, we can show that any increasing subsequence of fD (r; t n )g 1 n=1 converges to D (r; t). Hence, fD (r; t n )g
converges to D (r; t). Hence, D (r; t) is continuous in t.
Proof of Proposition 2: It is straightforward to check that each of (2.9), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) is a continuous discount function in the sense of De…nition 2. It is also straightforward to check that (2.10) is a discount function. The reason the latter is not a continuous discount function is that lim 
Now suppose that ' is onto. Let p 2 (0; 1]. Hence, also, ' (r) p 2 (0; 1]. Since ' is onto (0; 1], we get ' (t) = ' (r) p for some t 2 [0; 1). But ' (t) = ' (r) p ' (r). Hence, t r. 
For all r, s and t, D (r; s) D (s; = D (r; s), which is independent of t, for all t 2 [s; 1). This can only hold if D (r; t) = F (r) (t), for all r and t (0 r t). In particular, F (r) (r) = D (r; r) = 1. Hence,
Hence, ' is a strictly decreasing function from [0; 1) into (0; 1]. If D is continuous, so that D (0; t) is onto, then ' is also onto. Proof of Proposition 6: Exponential: ' (t) = e t . PPL: ' (0) = 1 and ' (t) = e t for t > 0. LP: ' (t) = (1 + t) . Generalized RS:
Proof of Proposition 7 (Invariance to the choice of reference time):
((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) w 0 ;r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) , , V r ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) V r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) , , D (0; r) V r ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) D (0; r) V r ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) ,
, by additivity, , V 0 ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) V 0 ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) , , ((x 1 ; s 1 ) ; (x 2 ; s 2 ) ; :::; (x m ; s m )) w 0 ;0 ((y 1 ; t 1 ) ; (y 2 ; t 2 ) ; :::; (y n ; t n )) .
To facilitate the proof of Propositions 8, below, and 22, later, we …rst establish Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 : Let x 0 and y 0. Then:
Proof of Lemma 1: Clearly, the results hold for x = 0. Suppose x > 0. Let z = Lemma 2 : Let > 0, 0 s < t and r > 0. Let f (r) = (t + r)
Proof of Lemma 2: Clearly, f (0) = 0. Also, f 0 (r) = (t + r)
Since f is continuous, it follows that f (r) > 0 for r > 0.
This establishes part (a). If 0 < < 1, then f 0 (r) < 0 for r > 0. Since f is continuous, it follows that f (r) < 0 for r > 0. This establishes part (b). Proof of Proposition 13 (Extension Theorem 1): (a) Let f and g be extension functions corresponding to the discount function D. Let r 2 [0; 1) and t 2 [r; 1). Then, by De…nition 11(ii), D (0; f (r; t)) = D (r; t) = D (0; g (r; t)). Since D (r; s) is strictly decreasing in s, it follows that f (r; t) = g (r; t). Hence, f = g. (b) We have D (0; t) = D (0; f (0; t)). Since D (0; s) is strictly decreasing in s, it follows that f (0; t) = t. We 29 It is tempting, at this stage, to take a shortcut and conclude, from the fact that G (XY ) = G (X) G (Y ), that, necessarily, G (X) = X c . However, the relevant theorem (Theorem 1.9.13 in Eichhorn (1978) or Theorem 3, page 41, in Aczel (1966) ) requires that G (X) be de…ned for all X > 0. However, 1 (t) is not de…ned for t < 0 and, hence, G (X) is not de…ned for X < 1.
30 It is su¢ cient that h be strictly decreasing in some interval: (a; a + ), a 0; > 0.
that exhibit -delay (De…nition 13), also exhibit the common di¤erence e¤ect for gains. Similarly, they exhibit the common di¤erence e¤ect for losses. Proof of Proposition 23: Let preferences with the continuous discount function, D, exhibit -delay. Then, by De…nition 13, its delay function is (s; t) = (s + t + s t ) 
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Proof of Proposition 32: These can be veri…ed by direct calculation using (2.10), (2.11), (2.12), (2.13) and (3.6).
